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1. Introduction 
The U.S. banking industry has experienced intense consolidation in the previous 
decades. Financial innovation and deregulation fostered successive bank merger waves. 
However, empirical research fails to provide conclusive evidence that the U.S. bank 
mergers create value for the bidding firms' shareholders. In fact, Cornett and De (1991), 
Houston and Ryngaert (1994), DeLong (2001), DeLong and DeYoung (2007), Brewer 
and Jagtianni (2013), among others, document marginally negative or insignificant 
market reaction for bidding firms at the merger announcement date. These findings 
contradict the consensus view, that mergers and acquisitions (M&As) occur for 
synergies. Notably, all of these studies examine M&As between listed firms, despite 
the fact that the majority of acquisitions by U.S banks involves unlisted targets. 
Motivated by the lack of empirical evidence for bank acquisitions of nonpublic firms, 
we attempt to shed light on this unexamined issue and investigate whether banks could 
gain if they choose to acquire unlisted targets. Therefore, we use a large and 
comprehensive sample of 2,178 M&As of public, privately-held, and subsidiary targets 
by U.S. banks announced over the period 1984 to 2015. Our initial findings indicate the 
existence of a “listing effect” in our sample, which is consistent with prior literature on 
non-financial M&As (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al, 2002; Officer et al., 2009; Netter et al., 
2011; Arikan and Stulz, 2016; Brander and Egan, 2017): bidders acquiring listed targets 
achieve negative announcement abnormal returns whereas bidders acquiring stand-
alone private companies earn significant abnormal returns upon the merger 
announcement. 
Importantly, when we examined the sources of this difference in market reaction 
between listed and unlisted bids, we find results that deviate from the empirical findings 
in non-financial M&As. Contrary to Chang (1998), Fuller et al. (2002), Officer et al. 
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(2009), and Netter et al. (2011), we do not find empirical support for any method of 
payment effects for private offers. In fact, when banks acquire private targets, 
announcement abnormal returns are positive and significant regardless of the method 
of payment. In addition, results for subsidiary targets do not suggest any difference in 
market reaction on whether the deal is financed with cash, stock, or a combination of 
cash and stock. Consequently, our empirical findings do not support the various 
hypotheses that have been profound to explain this phenomenon, such as the monitoring 
activities by target shareholders in equity offers, or the mitigation of the target firm’s 
uncertainty in stock-swap acquisitions. 
Next, we examine if the use of a financial advisor on the part of the bidder may 
contribute to the pattern of abnormal returns in private offers. By definition, 
uncertainties regarding the valuation of financial firms are fundamentally different than 
for non-financial firms. Therefore, we hypothesize that the use of a financial advisor 
may help the acquirer to mitigate the risks from the uncertain valuation of the target 
firm, especially in private offers, where information regarding the target is not widely 
available. To test this hypothesis, we collect bidder advisor date for our sample, which 
restricts the number of useable observation to 1,055. Interestingly, our findings indicate 
that the use of a financial advisor by the bidding bank has an adverse effect on 
announcement period returns in public and private offers. More specifically, in public 
bids, abnormal returns are on average 1.34% lower when the bidding firm employs a 
financial advisor. By contrast, when bidding banks use financial advisory services in 
private offers, they experience approximately 2.06% larger average abnormal returns. 
Results for subsidiary targets are inconclusive. Hence, we conjecture that advisory 
services are more meaningful in private offers, since the valuation of the target firm 
incorporates increased uncertainty. Finally, we test for the effect of the bidder advisor 
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reputation on bidder returns, and we find a negative or at best insignificant relationship 
between the use top-tier advisors and announcement period returns for all types of 
mergers (McLaughlin, 1992; Hunter and Jagtianni, 2003; Ismail 2010; Graham et al., 
2015). 
We also consider the possibility that there could be a bidder-specific driver of 
acquisition success that can better explain the variation of abnormal returns across the 
several types of M&As (Golubov et al., 2015). We find that even after the inclusion of 
bidder fixed effects in our regression analyses, banks that acquire private firms and 
employ financial advisors enjoy the highest possible abnormal returns. Further, we also 
control for the possibility that the choice of the target firm is endogenously determined. 
In order to address this issue, we employ the two-stage procedure outlined by Heckman 
(1979), and we find that all our results continue to hold after controlling for potential 
endogenous sample selection.   
Our study is related to the extensive literature on the listing effect on non-financial U.S. 
mergers (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002; Officer, 2009; Netter et al., 2011, Arikan and 
Stulz, 2016). We apply a similar process in a different context- M&As by U.S. banking 
firms- and find, a significant difference in market reaction between public and 
nonpublic bids. Further, our study is also related to the literature on the interaction 
between bidder financial advisors and announcement period gains (Servaes and Zenner, 
1996; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Golubov et al., 2012; Graham et al., 2015). Our 
empirical results indicate that bidding banks could realize positive abnormal returns as 
long as they acquire privately-held firms, and use financial advisory to resolve potential 
uncertainties regarding the target firm’s valuation. These findings contradict the 
consensus view that banks lose upon the announcement of a merger (Houston and 
Ryngaert, 1994; DeLong, 2003; Gupta and Misra, 2007, Brewer and Jagtiani, 2013). 
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To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine bank acquisitions under 
this perspective. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature and develops the implications of the prior empirical findings in our study. 
Section 3 details the data collection for the empirical analysis. Sections 4 and 5 present 
the univariate and multivariate empirical analysis, respectively. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related background and research questions 
There is a plethora of studies examining the relation between bidder returns and the 
target firm’s listing status in non-financial U.S. M&As. Chang (1998), Fuller et al., 
(2002), Moeller et al. (2004), Officer et al. (2009) all find positive abnormal returns for 
acquirers of private firms and subsidiaries. The authors also document a positive 
relation between bidder returns and equity financing in such deals. 
There are several explanations for the larger returns to acquiring firms when the target 
is unlisted. Chang (1998) suggests that equity offers for private firms tend to create 
outside blockholders that could serve as effecting monitors of managerial performance. 
Fuller et al. (2002) document similar results and illustrate tax considerations benefits 
as an alternative explanation for the higher abnormal returns for stock offers relative to 
cash offers for private targets. Moeller et al. (2004) outline the importance of the 
acquiring firm’s size in explaining the difference in market reaction between listed and 
unlisted targets. Acquirers of private targets are more likely to be smaller and pay less 
for acquisitions than acquirers of public targets. Officer et al. (2009) find a significant 
positive relation between announcement period returns and stock financing in difficult-
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to-value targets, since stock financing is considered to mitigate information asymmetry 
about the uncertain value of the target firm. In fact, the effect of target-valuation 
uncertainty is more evident to acquisitions of nonpublic firms, since private firms are 
more opaque in comparison to publicity traded companies.  
Recent empirical work in M&As also documents a significant difference in market 
reaction between listed and unlisted targets. John et al. (2010) highlight the importance 
of the target country’s investor protection in determining the magnitude of the listing 
effect on bidder gains. By using a large sample of cross-border acquisitions of public 
and private firms by U.S. bidders, the authors find that in high investor protection target 
countries bidder abnormal returns are significantly negative for public targets and 
significantly positive for private targets. Netter et al. (2011) utilize a large sample of 
non-financial U.S. acquisitions of both public and private firms, and find comparable 
results with previous studies: in stock offers, bidders realize the lowest returns when 
the target is publicly-traded and the highest when the target is a private firm. Arikan 
and Stulz (2016), show that acquiring firms have better growth opportunities and realize 
higher announcement returns in acquisitions of nonpublic firms. Brander and Egan 
(2017) examine acquisition of both public and private firms under the winner’s curse 
perspective. Their findings indicate a stronger winner’s curse in public offers, since the 
proportion of acquiring firms realizing negative announcement returns is substantially 
higher in such deals.  
It has been documented in the literature that uncertainty in non-financial M&As 
constitutes a key element in explaining bidder abnormal returns (Hansen, 1987; Moeller 
et al., 2007; Officer et al., 2009). In fact, acquirers of more opaque targets experience a 
larger fraction of total acquisition gains, since they are able to obtain superior 
information regarding the target firm’s value during the due diligence process (Luypaert 
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and Van Caneghem, 2017). It is therefore likely, that the use of a financial advisor may 
help the acquiring firm to gather such information and identify potential synergetic 
opportunities. In fact, one important aspect of the financial advisory services is to 
ascertain the informationally opaque target value to the acquiring firm. Servaes and 
Zenner (1996) found that financial advisors are used in more complex transactions that 
are characterized by significant asymmetric information. 
There is a growing literature that examines the relation between financial advisory 
services and bidder abnormal returns. Bowers and Miller (1990) found that the choice 
of a financial advisor constitutes an important determinant of merger gains for acquiring 
firms. In their more recent studies, Ismail (2010) and Graham et al. (2015) suggest that 
acquiring firms garner higher abnormal returns when they employ non-top-tier financial 
advisors, rather than large prestigious investment banks. On the other hand, Golubov et 
al. (2012) document a positive relationship between advisor reputation and bidder 
CARs, after controlling for selection bias issues. 
All the aforementioned studies focus exclusively on non-financial M&As. Therefore, it 
would be interesting to investigate whether such findings have any application in 
acquisitions by U.S. banks. In our study, we examine whether banking firms could 
realize positive abnormal returns by acquiring unlisted firms. In addition, we identify 
if there is any relation between the use of a financial advisor by the acquiring firm and 
announcement period gains. It is commonly held that financial firms are inherently 
more opaque than non-financial firms (Wagner, 2007; Kwan and Carleton, 2010). If we 
assume that information gathering is indeed meaningful to acquiring firms, then it is 
reasonable to expect that the use of a financial advisor would translate to higher bidder 
abnormal returns, especially in cases where information regarding the target is not 
widely available.  
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3. Sample and data 
We collect merger data from Thomson ONE database.  Our sample consists of all 
successful M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids announced between January 
1, 1984 and December 31, 2015.1 We retrieve mergers that meet the following criteria:  
1. Bidding firms are commercial banks with a three-digit primary SIC code equal 
to 602, or bank holding companies with a four-digit primary SIC code equal to 
6712. 
2. The bidder is publicly-traded. The target is a public firm, a private firm, or an 
unlisted subsidiary of a public firm. 
3. All public firms are listed on NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq. 
4. Bidding firms have available return data on the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) for at least five days around the merger announcement and 
Compustat data for the year-end prior to the merger announcement. 
5. The bidder acquired an interest of above 50% in the target firm, raising its 
interest from below 50% to above 50%. 
6. The deal value is disclosed and above $1 million. 
The criteria result in an initial sample of 2,321 M&As, where 817 of the targets were 
listed on an exchange, 1323 were stand-alone private companies, and 181 were 
subsidiaries of listed firms. We follow Fuller et al. (2002) and we exclude from the 
sample 110 clustered mergers, where the bidding bank acquired more than one target 
firms within 5 days, in order to isolate the bidder’s abnormal return for a specific merger 
                                                
1 Barnes et al. (2014) suggest that Thomson ONE data (former SDC) are reliable from 1984 and onward 
while early 1980s are not recommended for research.  
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(24 public targets, 79 private targets, and 7 subsidiary targets). We further eliminate 5 
duplicate listings from the sample (1 public target, 4 private targets). Duplicates are 
defined as instances where the same bidder, target and announcement date are listed 
more than once in the Thomson ONE database.2 Similar to Hagendorff and Vallascas 
(2011), we also exclude 20 mergers which involved failing institutions, as reported by 
Thomson ONE (2 public targets, 15 private targets, 3 subsidiary targets). Finally, we 
exclude 8 mergers where data for the method of payment are not available (6 private 
targets, 2 subsidiary targets). Our final sample consists of 2,178 mergers, where 790 of 
the targets were listed firms, 1,219 were private companies, and 169 were unlisted 
subsidiaries of listed firms.  
3.1 Sample statistics 
Table 1 shows the inflation-adjusted (base 2015 dollars) mean value of transaction and 
the number of mergers per year. The merger sample is segmented based on the target 
firm’s listing status. Evidently, the number and size of M&As do not increase 
monotonically through time in each category. Initially, we observe a sharp increase in 
merger activity in the 1990s, for all three types of mergers. This increase is consistent 
with Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), who document that the deregulation wave of the 
1990s has spurred intense consolidation in the U.S. banking industry. In the new 
millennium, merger activity experienced a downward trend, and did not peak until the 
mid 2000s. The 2008 financial crisis led to a further dramatic decrease in the level of 
banking consolidation. However, in the most recent years, U.S. bank M&A activity 
exhibits an increasing trend, following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act (Leledakis 
and Pyrgiotakis, 2016). 
                                                
2 Duplicates emerge from errors in updating Thomson ONE data. In these cases, when new information 
is available for a M&A transaction, a new record is created in the database while the previous one still 
exists. 
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Insert Table 1 here 
Table 2 reports the distribution of our merger sample by target firm’s industry 
affiliation, using 48-industry classifications from Fama and French (1997). Industries 
definitions are based on the four-digit primary SIC codes.3 We report by industry the 
number of banks making successful bids for all types of targets, and we further divide 
the sample based on the target firm’s listing status. Interestingly, almost the whole 
sample (98.62%) involves targets within the financial industry, whereas the vast 
majority of deals (89.39%) are limited to bank-to-bank mergers.  
Insert Table 2 here 
Table 3 provides additional data describing the sample. Panel A reports the mean and 
median values for deal-specific characteristics of our sample. Transaction value is the 
total amount of consideration paid by the bidding bank excluding fees and expenses (in 
2015 million $). Not surprisingly, the dollar value of M&As is much larger for listed 
targets than private or subsidiary targets. Notably, mergers involving public targets are 
approximately 22 times larger compared to mergers involving private targets. Days to 
completion is the number of calendar days between the announcement and effective 
dates, and serves as a proxy for merger complexity. The length of a merger is larger for 
deals involving public targets than for deals involving unlisted firms, suggesting that as 
mergers get larger and more complex, the time to close a deal increases. Following 
Martin (1996), we group the method of payment into three different categories: (1) Cash 
payments include combinations of cash, debt, or liabilities. (2) Stock payments include 
financing with common stock or combinations of common stock and options or 
                                                
3 Primary SIC codes denote the primary line of business for a company. However, up to ten different SIC 
codes may be assigned to each firm, based on the lines of business the company is involved. Therefore, 
a target firm in our sample may be characterized a bank by its primary SIC code, but it could also engage 
in trading, insurance, or real estate activities.  
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warrants. (3) Combo financing includes combinations of cash, common stock, debt, 
preferred stock, convertible securities and methods classified as “Other consideration” 
by Thomson ONE database. We observe that stock financing is the prevailing method 
of payment for acquisitions of public and private targets, whereas in the case of 
subsidiary targets, bidding banks prefer to pay with cash. Lastly, geographical focus is 
expressed by the percentage of the same state deals.  
Panel B of Table 3 reports the mean and median values for bidder-specific 
characteristics. We provide data on the bidding firm’s size (total assets and market 
value of equity) and profitability. In line with the literature on non-financial firms, the 
average bidder of public targets is larger compared to the average bidder of private 
targets. Average bidder profitability, as measured by return on assets (ROA) is 1.04, 
1.07, and 0.99 for listed, private and subsidiary targets, respectively. 
Insert Table 3 here 
3.2 Financial advisor data 
In order to test the relation between bidder abnormal returns and financial advisory 
services we download financial advisor data for the bidding banks of our sample. More 
precisely, we collect information on whether or not any advisors were used by the 
bidding firm, number of advisors used and advisor’s full name, from Thomson ONE 
database. For our whole sample of 2,178 M&As, we identified 1,055 mergers with 
complete information about bidder financial advisors (540 public targets, 443 private 
targets, and 72 subsidiary targets). Out of the 1,055 sampled deals, 861 were advised 
by at least one investment bank, and 194 deals did not involve any financial advisors 
on the part of the bidder (in-house deals).   
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We also control for the financial advisor’s reputation, to test whether top-tier 
investment banks are perceived to provide better services in bank acquirers than non-
top-tier advisors. Hence, we download financial advisors league tables from Thomson 
ONE database for deals announced and completed during the period January 1984 to 
December 2015. Table 6 presents financial advisor rankings according to the dollar 
value of transaction handled by the advisor during the sample period. Interestingly, the 
top-11 advisors are the same in both announced and completed deals’ rankings. 
Following Fang (2005), we classify advisors into two tiers: the top-8 investment banks 
are defined as “top-tier” and all other financial advisors as “non-top-tier”. The use of 
this binary classification is preferable econometrically, since the use of a continuous 
variable would imply that the separate tiers should have a constant effect on bidder 
abnormal returns. The top-8 financial advisors are: Goldman Sachs & Co, Morgan 
Stanley, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan, Citi, Credit Suisse, Barclays, and 
Lazard. Most of these investment banks appear in league tables of prior studies (Rau, 
2000; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Golubov et al., 2012). Hence, we suggest that financial 
advisors’ reputation is relatively stable overtime. 
In order to correctly assign the reputation of each financial advisor, we follow Golubov 
et al. (2012), and we account for the M&As between financial advisors. For example, 
Bank of America was not a top-tier financial advisor prior to the acquisition of Merrill 
Lynch in 2008. Hence, mergers advised by Bank of America before 2008 are classified 
as advised by a non-top-tier financial advisor. Finally, in case a bidding bank had 
employed multiple financial advisors, the deal is classified as advised by a top-tier 
advisor if at least one of the advisors belongs to the top-8 group (Servaes and Zenner, 
1996). 
Insert Table 4 here 
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4. Univariate Analysis 
We use the standard event study methodology, outlined by Brown and Warner (1985), 
to evaluate bidder gains around the merger announcement dates. We estimate 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over a five-day event window, centered on the 
announcement date (-2, +2) using the market adjusted return model:4 
, , ,i t i t m tAR R R= -  
Where Ri,t is the return for stock i on day t and Rm,t  is the market return on the CRSP 
NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq value-weighted index on day t. We do not estimate market model 
parameters over a time interval prior to the merger announcement to account for the 
possibility that a bidding bank had announced onether merger at some point during the 
estimation period (Fuller et al., 2002).5 We evaluate the statistical significance of our 
results based on the standardized cross-section test of Boehmer et al. (1991). This 
procedure corrects for potential increases in the variance of abnormal returns, 
commonly found in event studies. Further, to account for the non-normal distribution 
of the security returns, we test the statistical significance of the median values by using 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Table 4 presents the mean CARs for bidding banks classified by the target firm’s listing 
status and method of payment. The first column of Table 4 reports CARs for the full 
sample of bidders. Consistent with prior empirical findings, bidding banks realize 
negative abnormal returns upon the announcement of a merger. However, when we 
                                                
4 We also examined other event windows frequently used in the literature (-1, +1), (-5, +1), (-10, +1), (-
10, +10), (-1, +10), (-30,+5). Results remained qualitatively similar.  
5 To ensure robustness of our results we have also estimated CARs using the market model and the mean 
adjusted returns model. Results remained unchanged. 
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differentiate returns based on the method of payment we observe that cash offers 
experience insignificant results, whereas mergers financed with any type of stock 
realize statistically negative abnormal returns. Segmenting by the type of the target 
firm, we are able to extract more conclusive results. In public bids, the average 
abnormal return for bidding firms is -1.45%, and statistical significant at 1% level 
(Cornett and De, 1991; Houston and Ryngaert, 1997; DeLong and DeYoung, 2007). 
Again, returns for the cash offers are indistinguishable for zero. However, in stock or 
combination offers, abnormal returns are negative and significant in the scale of -1.61% 
and -1.63%, respectively. The median abnormal returns for these deals are -1.37% and 
-1.64%, respectively, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is significant in both cases. 
Therefore, in public bank M&As, equity offers translate to a negative market reaction 
(Travlos, 1987). On the contrary, in private bids, the average bidding bank earns a 
0.58% abnormal return, which is statistical significant at 1% level. These results suggest 
that bidders of privately held targets experience approximately 2.03% larger abnormal 
returns compared to bidders of publicly traded targets, on average. This difference is 
statistical significant at 1% level (t=9.84). Interestingly, in private offers, bidder 
abnormal returns are positive and significant regardless of the method of payment: cash 
(0.61%), stock (0.56%), and combination (0.57%). Medians are significant in all cases 
except from equity offers. In the case of subsidiary targets, the bidders CARs are 
insignificant for all groups. However, the difference in market reaction between public 
and subsidiary offers is also significant at 1% (t=4.17). Overall, our results support the 
existence of a “listing effect” in M&As between U.S. banks and domestic unlisted 
targets. Henceforth, in our discussion of results, we focus on mean CARs, since mean 
and median CARs tell the same story. 
Insert Table 5 here 
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4.1 Explanations of the listing effect in bidder CARs 
The majority of the U.S. studies that examine the listing effect in M&As attribute the 
difference in market reaction between public and private bids to method of payment 
effects. The monitoring hypothesis outlined by Chang (1998), suggests that acquisitions 
of closely-held private firms result in the creation of outside blockholders that act as 
effective monitors of acquirer’s managerial performance. Consequently, when bidding 
firms pay with common stock for private targets, they experience a positive revaluation 
of their share price. Fuller et al. (2002) document that equity offers in private bids could 
result in more positive abnormal returns, since the shareholders of the target firm would 
share any potential risks from overvaluation. Accordingly, Officer et al. (2009) 
demonstrate that stock offers for difficult-to-value targets translate to positive bidder 
announcement returns in acquisitions of unlisted targets. Apparently, all these 
hypotheses predict that, in acquisitions of privately-held targets, bidder CARs should 
be significantly larger when firms pay with stock instead of cash. Our results however, 
are inconsistent with these findings. In particular, bidding banks realize positive 
abnormal returns in private offers, irrespective of the method of payment (differences 
across subsamples of private targets are insignificant). Furthermore, in the case of 
subsidiary targets, abnormal returns do not differ for cash, equity, or mixed offers. 
Hence, we posit that the traditional explanations for the listing effect do not account for 
the difference in market reaction between listed and unlisted targets, for bank acquirers. 
For example, the monitoring hypothesis, one of the most common explanations for the 
listing effect is non-financial U.S. mergers, assumes that private firms are family-
owned or closely-held. However, in our sample, Thomson ONE reports only 3 cases 
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where private target firms were family-owned.6 It is therefore unlikely that the 
ownership structure of the target firm would have a monitoring effect in the case of 
M&As by U.S. banks. 
One alternative explanation for the listing effect assumes limited competition for the 
privately-held targets, due to the higher costs of obtaining accurate information. In a 
limited competition environment, bidders may realize positive abnormal returns, since 
the likelihood of underpayment is higher (Chang, 1998). In addition, James and Wier 
(1987), Cornett and De (1991), and others, document that the number of bids per target 
firm (proxy for competition) relates to statistically lower announcement returns, since 
the winning firm might overpay to win the bidding war. However, as shown in Table 
3, the vast majority of target firms receive only one public bid: public targets (98.10%), 
private targets (99.92%), subsidiary targets (100%). Hence, bidding banks face almost 
no competition in acquiring either listed or unlisted targets. It is therefore unlikely that 
the limited competition hypothesis can explain the listing effect in M&As by U.S. 
banking firms.  
Another strand of the M&As literature suggests that merger gains may be capitalized 
before the official merger announcement. For example, Schipper and Thomson (1983) 
find significant bidder gains in the pre-acquisition period, and attribute their findings to 
potential leakage of information. In this case, measuring abnormal returns at the 
announcement date may underestimate the market reaction for the transaction, since 
such leakage would show-up in the pre-announcement bidder returns. Hypothetically, 
this is a more likely scenario in deals than involve two listed firms, where information 
regarding the merging firms is more widely available, than in acquisitions of unlisted 
                                                
6 A target is characterized as “family-owned” if at least a family, a group of families, or a non-founding 
chairman controls 20% of the firm.  
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firms. Hence, the difference in announcement abnormal returns between listed and 
unlisted bids may not reflect a difference in wealth creation, since merger gains for 
public offers might have been ex-ante capitalized and impounded in the stock price. To 
account for this possibility, we examine if there is a run-up in the bidding firm’s stock 
price, emanating from any potential leakage of information regarding the acquisition. 
Following Faccio et al. (2006) we compute pre-announcement abnormal returns over 
the window (-15, -3). Over this interval, abnormal returns are positive for all types of 
mergers, but significant only for the private offers. More precisely, bidder CARs are: 
0.10% for public targets, 0.46% for private targets, and 0.63% for subsidiary targets. 
Therefore, these results are inconsistent with the assumption that prior capitalization of 
merger gains accounts for the listing effect in our sample.7 
4.2 Regulatory effects on bidder CARs 
The U.S. banking industry is accustomed to legislative tsunamis. Federal legislations 
usually incorporate several regulations governing bank merger activity. Prior studies 
have outlined the important effect of regulatory changes on merger wealth gains (Carow 
and Heron, 1998; Becher, 2000, 2009; Filson and Olfatti. 2014; Leledakis and 
Pyrgiotakis, 2016). Therefore, we test whether these legislative changes could explain 
the difference in market reaction between public and nonpublic bids. 
During our sample period, four consecutive pieces of federal legislation made 
substantial changes in the permissible bank merger activity. Initially, the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), allowed 
commercial banks to acquire failed thrift institutions. The Riegle-Neal Interstate 
                                                
7 We also examine deals that began as a rumor. Thomson ONE identifies a rumor for possible acquisition 
for 26, 9, and 8 acquisitions of public, private, and subsidiary targets, respectively. Given the small 
number of deals in each category, it is quite unlikely that rumors of acquisitions could explain the listing 
effect in our sample.  
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Branching and Efficiency Act of 1994 eliminated all restrictions to interstate branching, 
and enabled banks to expand nationwide through M&As. Furthermore, the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999 (GLBA) effectively removed all the 
barriers that prohibited commercial banks from expanding into the securities and 
insurance industries. On the contrary, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (DFA) raised the barriers to consummating merger 
transactions, and imposed stricter concentration limits to prevent future consolidation 
among large, systemically important financial institutions. 
We follow Gupta and Misra (2007), and we disaggregate our sample in separate 
regulatory periods, according to the dates when provisions of each piece of legislation 
became effective:8 Pre-FIRREA period (January 1984 to September 1989), FIRREA 
period (October 1989 to June 1997), Riegle-Neal period (July 1997 to March 2000), 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley period (April 2000 to June 2010), and Dodd-Frank period (July 
2010 to December 2015). 
Table 5 summarizes bidder abnormal returns for different regulatory periods, 
segmented by the target firm’s listing status. For the whole sample of mergers, we 
observe that returns vary significantly across regulatory periods. More specifically, 
mean CARs are negative and significant in the Pre-FIRREA, FIRREA, and Riegle-Neal 
periods, while in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley period, bidding banks realize a mean 
abnormal return of 0.10%, which is statistical significant at 5%. After the enactment of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, bidders experience significant wealth gains, in the scale of 0.79%, 
on average (Leledakis and Pyrgiotakis, 2016). For public bids, results are consistent 
with prior U.S. bank M&As studies: bidder CARs are negative and significant at 1% 
                                                
8	Alternatively, we classified the sample according to the dates the separate legislations were signed into 
law. Results were qualitatively similar.	
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level, ranging from -2.80% in the pre-FIRREA period to -1.00% in the GLBA period. 
In the Dodd-Frank period however, abnormal returns for bidding banks are 
indistinguishable from zero. For private offers, abnormal returns are positive in all but 
the pre-FIRREA period, but significant only in the FIRREA and DFA periods. Results 
for subsidiary targets are insignificant, regardless of the regulatory changes.  
These results indicate that legislative changes could have a significant impact on bidder 
abnormal returns. However, we are mostly interested in examining whether the 
difference in market reaction between public and nonpublic bids persists across 
regulatory periods. The last two columns of Table 5 report the differences between the 
means and medians for private and public targets, and subsidiary and public targets, 
respectively.9 Our results indicate that bidder abnormal returns are larger for private 
and subsidiary targets than for public targets for all regulatory periods, and the 
magnitude of these differences does not vary substantially overtime. In terms of 
statistical significance, differences between means and medians for private and public 
targets are significant at 1% level in all regulatory periods. For subsidiary targets, 
differences are abnormal returns significant in all but the DFA period. Thus, the 
interpretation of these results is that the listing effect persists through time and is not 
due to any legislative changes in the U.S. banking industry.  
 
Insert Table 6 here 
4.3 CARs at the completion date 
                                                
9 Significance for the difference between mean CARs and median CARs is based on the t-test and on the 
Mann-Whitney test, respectively. 
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All the prior empirical work we have documented so far focuses on announcement 
period returns, implying that all expected price reactions should occur at the 
announcement of a bid. However, in practice, not all announced mergers are finally 
completed. An important feature of the financial sector is that regulatory approval is 
mandatory for the completion of a transaction. Regulators may reject an application if 
the acquisition does not satisfy the public benefit criteria, or exceed several 
concentration limits (Desai and Stover, 1983).  
It is therefore likely that the probability of success may influence the market reaction 
upon the announcement of a proposed merger. In fact, the uncertain outcome may 
induce investors to postpone their reaction at a time where the bidder intention to 
acquire is indeed materialized. We explore whether the likelihood of an acquisition 
success is higher for unlisted targets than for listed targets. In this case, the 
announcement abnormal returns for the public bids could be downward biased 
compared to the returns for private bids. However, abnormal returns at the deal 
completion date may be higher for public than for private bids. As a result, the listing 
effect in announcement period gains may be explained by a difference in the proportion 
of successful acquisitions between the separate types of targets.   
We base the assumption of a different probability in acquisition success for listed and 
unlisted target on two main arguments. Firstly, the Williams Act of 1968 mandates 
information disclose and waiting periods for acquisitions of publicly-traded firms, 
whereas such requirements are not applicable to acquisitions of privately-held firms. 
Hence, acquisitions of private targets may be announced when completed (Officer et 
al., 2009). Secondly, acquisitions of public firms are typically larger, suggesting that 
regulatory approval is a less likely scenario.  
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In the spirit of Faccio et al. (2006), we identify acquisitions that were announced as 
completed transactions at the initial announcement date. From our whole sample of 
2,178 M&As, only 79 deals where announced when completed (1 public target, 64 
private targets, 14 subsidiary targets). Thus, for the remaining 2,099 deals there was 
uncertainty regarding the successful completion of the proposed transaction (789 public 
targets, 1,155 private targets, 155 subsidiary targets). Further, we identified 206 M&As 
that were announced but not completed during the examination period (103 public 
targets, 96 private targets, 7 subsidiary targets). Accordingly, the probability of success 
for a public bid is (789/(789+103))= 88.45%, the probability of success for a private 
bid is (1,155/(1,155+96))= 92.33%, and the probability of success for a subsidiary bid 
is (155/(155+7))= 95.68%. Consistent with our prediction, the probability of a 
successful acquisition in the case of a listed target is smaller relative to an unlisted 
target, albeit the differences are small.  
At last, we examine whether these differences in acquisition success probabilities 
translate into differences in bidder abnormal returns at deal completion dates. In line 
with announcement period returns, we estimate bidder CARs over a five-day window, 
centered on the completion date. We include in the analysis only the bidders of the 
2,099 M&As in which there was uncertainty about the success of the acquisition.10 In 
fact, CARs are positive for all types of mergers, but significant only for public offers. 
More specifically, bidder completion CARs are: 0.32% for public targets, 0.10% for 
private targets, and 0.47% for subsidiary targets. These results indicate that market 
participants do indeed reward bidding banks when they complete an acquisition of a 
public firm. However, differences between public and private offers, and public and 
subsidiary offers are insignificant, suggesting that the market reaction at the deal 
                                                
10 Results were qualitatively similar for the whole sample of 2,178 M&As 
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completion date does not offset the difference in market reaction between listed and 
unlisted targets at the announcement of such bids.  
4.4. The role of financial advisors 
Panel A of Table 7 presents the bidder CARs for the sample of the 1,055 M&As, 
segmenting by the target firm’s listing status. Apparently, the results are consistent with 
the listing effect analyzed previously in this section, since bidder CARs in acquisitions 
of unlisted targets are significantly larger than in acquisition of listed targets.11 In Panel 
B we partition the sample based on whether or not the bidding banks had used a 
financial advisor. For the whole sample of 1,055 mergers we find that the use of an 
advisor does not affect announcement abnormal returns, since returns in both cases are 
negative and significant but their difference is not statistical significant (Servaes and 
Zenner, 1996). However, by segmenting again based on the target firm’s listing status 
we are able to extract more conclusive results. In particular, in-house deals for public 
offers produce insignificant abnormal returns, whereas when an advisor is used, public 
bids experience a mean abnormal return in the scale of -1.90%, which is statistical 
significant at 1% level. On the contrary, in acquisitions of privately-held targets, we 
observe a different pattern: for in-house deals, average abnormal returns are -0.59% 
and marginally significant, whereas when an advisor is used, bidder CARs are 1.47%, 
and statistical significant at 1% level. Results for subsidiary targets are inconclusive. 
Therefore, we observe an adverse effect of financial advisors on bidding banks’ 
cumulative abnormal returns for public and private offers. Our findings suggest that 
financial advisory is more meaningful to the acquisitions of privately-held targets, since 
private financial firms should be more opaque than their publicly-traded rivals. Lastly, 
                                                
11 In addition, the method of payment does not influence bidder CARs in the subsample of 443 private 
offers. In particular, bidder CARs are 0.84%, 0.74%, and 1.13%, for cash, stock, and combination offers, 
respectively.  
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Panel C of Table 7 details CARs based on the financial advisors’ reputation. Similar to 
McLaughlin (1992), Rau 2000, Ismail (2010), and Graham et al., (2015), announcement 
abnormal returns to bidders advised by top-tier advisors are lower than those earned 
non-top-tier advised bidders. 
 
Insert Table 7 here 
Overall, we conjecture that the use of financial advisors could at least partly explain the 
listing effect in acquisitions by U.S. banks. In fact, when bidding banks employ 
financial advisors, they experience approximately 3.37% higher abnormal returns on 
average when the target is privately-held than when the target is publicly-traded. The 
difference is statistical significant at 1% level (t=7.90).  
 
5. Multivariate analysis 
In the previous section, we analyze the bidding banks’ abnormal returns using 
univariate analysis. The results of the univariate analysis indicate considerable variation 
in bidder abnormal returns. Therefore, we perform multivariate tests of the determinants 
of bidder CARs, to ensure the robustness of the aforementioned results. In our 
regression, we estimate bidder returns as a function of deal- and bidder-specific 
characteristics, frequently used in the literature. The dependent variable is the five-day 
bidder CARs centered on the announcement date. All independent variables are defined 
in the Appendix. 
Hence, we conduct OLS regressions for the whole sample of 2,178 mergers and for 
three separate subsamples based on the target firm’s listing status. For each category 
we run several models, to account for the differences in usable observations between 
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the initial sample and the sample where financial advisor data are used. Further, in order 
to reduce a possible effect of outliers, we winsorize all the continuous variables at 1% 
and 99% level. We control for heteroskedasticity by estimating robust standard errors, 
following White (1980). Correlation coefficients of the independent variables indicate 
a weak to moderate degree of linear relationship among the several sets of variables.12 
Hence, to investigate whether multicollinearity is present in our models, we calculate 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each independent variable in each regression. 
In general, VIF values greater than 10 may merit further investigation. In our case, 
mean VIFs range from 1.89 to 3.94, suggesting that multicollinearity should not be a 
problem in our regression analysis. 
5.1. Regression analysis results 
Table 8 presents the results of our multivariate regressions for all, public, private, and 
subsidiary acquisitions, respectively. The first three columns illustrate results for the 
whole sample, irrespective of the target firm’s listing status. In all three models, the 
coefficients of Private and Subsidiary are positive and statistical significant. The 
magnitude of their coefficients suggests that: (1) the average acquisition of a privately-
held firm earns a 1.5% in model 1 and a 2% in models 2 and 3 larger abnormal return 
than the average acquisition of a public firm, and (2) the average acquisition of a 
subsidiary earns a 1.2% in models 1 and 2 and a 1.3% in model 3 larger abnormal return 
than the average acquisition of a public firm. These results are in line with prior studies 
that document a listing effect in non-financial U.S M&As (Fuller et al. 2002; John et al 
2010). Consistent with Officer et al. (2009), Bidder idiosyncratic volatility has a 
significant positive effect on bidder CARs in models 1 and 3. In unreported results we 
                                                
12 The highest correlation coefficient is 0.56 (in absolute value) between Bidder Size and RelSize, for the 
subsample of 1,291 private targets. 
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also included an interaction term of Volatility with Stock, with no substantive changes 
in our results.13 A handful of the remaining independent variables bear statistical 
significant coefficients in the regressions for the whole sample. The coefficient of 
Combo is negative and significant in models 1 and 3, suggesting that combination offers 
translate to lower bidder abnormal returns. RelSize is negative and significant in model 
1, but loses significance as financial advisor data are included in the analysis. The 
negative coefficient of Pooling indicates that when bidding banks use the purchase 
method to incorporate the target into their books, they experience larger abnormal 
returns. Coefficients for the regulatory dummies are all positive, but significant for the 
FIRREA, GLBA, and DFA period in model 1, and only GLBA and DFA periods in 
model 3, respectively. These findings indicate that bidder abnormal returns were 
significantly larger for bids occurring during these specific regulatory periods, 
compared to the Pre-FIRREA period.  
Models 4 to 6 report regression results for the subset of publicly-traded targets. 
Consistent with the results for the whole sample, combination offers relate to a negative 
market reaction in acquisitions of public targets. In addition, RelSize is negative and 
significant in model 4, suggesting that bidder’s returns decrease with the relative size 
of the target in public acquisitions (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Travlos, 1987). Volatility 
is positive and significant in model 4, albeit loses significance with the addition of the 
financial advisor data. On the other hand, Pooling has a negative and statistical 
significant coefficient in all models, implying that the purchase method is superior to 
the pooling accounting method in terms of bidder CARs, for public bids. Furthermore, 
the variable Advisors is negative, and statistical significant in both models 5 and 6. The 
                                                
13 Moeller et al. (2007) find a negative relationship between bidder CARs in public bids financed with 
stock and bidder idiosyncratic volatility.  
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magnitude of its coefficients indicate that in public offers, bidders who use financial 
advisors experience -1.2% in model 5, and -1.7% in model 6, lower abnormal returns 
than bidders of in-house deals, on average. Lastly, coefficients for FIRREA, GLBA, 
and DFA, suggest that these regulatory periods had a significantly positive effect on 
bidder CARs, compared to the Pre-FIRREA period (Gupta and Misra, 2007, Leledakis 
and Pyrgiotakis, 2016).  
Results for the private offers are similar to what we have found with the univariate 
analysis. The insignificant coefficients of Stock and Combo in all three models suggest 
that method of payment does not influence bidder returns in acquisitions of privately-
held targets. This finding contrasts the traditional explanation of the listing effect in 
non-financial U.S. mergers, which suggest that when bidders pay with stock in private 
offers they experience larger abnormal returns (Chang, 1998). Consistent with Fuller et 
al. (2002), we document a different relationship between bidder returns and the relative 
size of the target for public and private bids. In particular, RelSize is positive and 
significant in both models 7 and 9, implying that the larger the target relative to the 
bidder in private offers, the larger the abnormal returns upon the announcement of the 
merger. As expected, the coefficient of Advisors in model 8 is positive and significant 
at 1% level. This suggests that in private offers, bidders who employ financial advisors 
earn a mean abnormal return of 1.6% larger than bidders of in-house deals. We 
therefore observe an adverse effect of financial advisors between public and private 
bids. Financial advisory services, such information gathering and processing should be 
more valuable in private acquisitions, since privately-held financial firms would be 
inherently more difficult to value than their publicly-traded counterparts. In model 7, 
the coefficients for the regulatory dummies are similar to the ones reported for the 
public bids. However, when advisor data are added, all regulatory dummies lose 
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significance, while the coefficient for the Advisors dummy remains significant. Finally, 
regressions 10 to 12 produce inconclusive results, suggesting that the traditional 
determinants of bidder abnormal returns do not explain the variation in bidding bank 
CARs for acquisitions of subsidiary targets.  
Interestingly, our results suggest that the size of the acquirer does not have a significant 
impact on the market reaction at the announcement of the merger.14 This findings 
contrast Moeller et al. (2004), who document that larger acquirers experience smaller 
abnormal returns. Houston and Ryngaert (1994), and DeLong (2001), support that 
geographical focus is associated with higher abnormal returns in bank mergers. In our 
regression however, we find weak evidence of any relation between geographical focus 
and bidder CARs. Similar to Becher and Campell (2005), we do not find any empirical 
support that prior bidder performance (ROA), affects merger gains. Lastly, our 
evidence shows an insignificant relation between bidder advisor reputation and 
announcement returns (Servaes and Zenner, 1996). 
Overall, the explanatory power of all our models is relatively low, since the Adjusted 
R2 ranges from 0% to 9.8%. Nonetheless, this finding is typically observed in 
regressions of bidder CARs (Fuller et al. 2002; DeLong 2003; Moeller et al., 2004).  
Insert Table 8 here 
5.2. Bidder fixed effects 
It is possible that the difference in market reaction between listed and unlisted bids does 
not relate to the target firm’s listing status. It is also possible that there could be a firm-
specific driver of acquisition success that can explain the variation in bidder abnormal 
                                                
14 We also used the natural logarithm of the bidding firm’s market value of equity 5 days before the 
merger announcement, as an alternative specification for Bidder Size. Results remained unchanged.  
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returns. In other words, firms that were good past acquirers are likely to engage in 
value-enhancing acquisitions in the future, and vice versa.  In this case, the persistency 
of the acquirer returns may account for the positive market reaction in specific merger 
announcements. It is also likely, that the listing effect is due to the differences in the 
characteristics between bidders of public and private targets, and does not relate to the 
type of the target. 
To control for these possibilities, Fuller et al. (2002) utilize a sample where the same 
bidders make different types of acquisitions. In particular, their sample consists of firms 
that made at least five successful acquisitions within a three-year period (both public 
and nonpublic). This research design enables the direct examination of the differences 
in announcement period returns for bidders of both public and private targets. Their 
results confirm the existence of a listing effect for firms that acquire targets of different 
listing status, in non-financial U.S. mergers. In our study however, we focus primarily 
on financial firms. This means that if we apply the criteria of Fuller et al. (2002), the 
number of usable observations will be dramatically decreased. Hence, in the spirit of 
Golubov et al. (2015), we include bidder fixed effects in the baseline regressions of 
Table 8, to test whether our results are determined by the listing status of the target firm, 
or the bidding firm itself.15 With this approach, we examine whether there is an 
unobserved, time-invariant, bidder-specific factor that can better explain the difference 
in market reaction between listed and unlisted bids. In our fixed effects regressions we 
include dummy variables to account for the different types of the target (Private, 
Subsidiary) as well as interactions terms between Private and Subsidiary dummies, with 
the Advisors and Top-Tier dummies, respectively. To ensure the robustness of our 
                                                
15 In this case, we do not partition the sample based on the target firm’s listing status, since the same 
bidder could have acquired both private and public targets. 
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aforementioned results, we expected the coefficients for the privately-held targets to be 
positive and statistical significant. As before, the dependent variable in all our 
regression is the five-day bidder CAR, centered on the announcement date. 
Table 9 illustrates the results of our fixed effects regressions. The coefficients of 
Combo, RelSize, Volatility, Pooling, FIRREA, GLBA, and DFA are similar to what we 
have found in the OLS regressions. Strikingly, our results indicate, that there is indeed 
a firm-specific factor that drives bidder abnormal returns. In all our models, bidder fixed 
effects are highly significant (at 1% level), leading us to reject the null hypothesis of 
insignificant joint effects. These findings imply that bidder returns are persistent 
overtime: good acquirers continue to create shareholder wealth value through M&As, 
while bad acquirers continue to perform poorly. Furthermore, in line with Golubov et 
al. (2015), the inclusion of the bidder fixed effects almost doubles the explanatory 
power of our regression models, since the Adjusted R2 ranges from 17.2% to 17.4%. 
However, what it is important to us is that the coefficients of Private and 
Private*Advisors are also positive and significant. The magnitude of their coefficients 
is comparable, albeit smaller, with the regression results reported in Table 8. These 
findings suggest that when bidding banks buy privately-held targets, and particularly 
when they employ a financial advisor for the transaction, they experience larger 
abnormal returns relative to their peers, even after controlling for any time-invariant 
bidder characteristics.  
 
Insert Table 9 here 
5.3. Control for sample selection  
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Our analysis so far is based on the assumption that the choice of target firm is 
exogenously determined. However, it is likely that the acquirers of private targets in 
our sample were not selected randomly from the population of U.S. banking firms, 
suggesting that the type of the target firm may be determined endogenously. In this 
case, the choice of a target firm may be correlated with certain bidder and/or deal-
specific characteristics, and the OLS estimates become unreliable. To address this 
sample selection issue, we employ Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure, using the 
inverse Mills ratio.  
As in Doukas et al. (2014), the first-stage equation of the Heckman’s procedure is 
estimated by a probit regression, where the dependent variable is one for acquirers of 
private targets and zero for acquirers of public targets. From this stage we construct the 
inverse Mills ratio that we add as an additional independent variable in the second-stage 
equation. Next, the second-stage equation is an OLS regression where the dependent 
variable is bidder CARs for private deals only. The coefficients we obtain from this 
regression are corrected for the sample selection bias. 
Table 10 presents the results for this analysis. We conduct the Henchman’s procedure 
three times, to obtain comparable results with the ones reported in Table 8. According 
to our probit models, the choice of private target is negatively related to geographical 
focus, any form of stock financing, relative size of the deal, bidder size, and the use of 
an advisor on the part of the bidder. The Pseudo R2 of these first-stage equations 
indicate that our probit models explain up to 29.7% of the choice between a public and 
a private target. More importantly, the results from the OLS regression in the second-
stage equations are almost identical with the results in Table 10. In private offers, bidder 
CARs increase with the use of a financial advisor, after controlling for sample selection. 
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In fact, the Inverse Mills ratio is insignificant in all three cases, suggesting that the 
selection bias should not be a primary concern in our regression analysis.16  
 
Insert Table 10 here 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we examine bidder abnormal returns in 2,178 successful M&As of 
publicly traded U.S. banking companies announced between 1984 and 2015, as well as 
the differences in stock market reaction for separate types of targets. Initially, our 
findings indicate the presence of a listing effect in acquisitions by U.S. banks: 
Cumulative abnormal returns for unlisted bids (privately-held companies and 
subsidiaries), are significantly larger than for listed bids. In fact, these results are in line 
with prior literature in non-financial U.S M&As.  
The intriguing part of this analysis however, is to find an explanation for this 
phenomenon. Much of the existing literature in the non-financial mergers attributes the 
different market reaction between listed and unlisted bids to method of payment effects. 
In particular, these explanations predict larger bidder CARs in private offers, when the 
deal is financed with common stock. Equity offers could help resolving financial 
asymmetries in the target firm’s valuation, or result in the creation of effective 
performance monitors in the bidding firm. Nonetheless, in our sample, we don’t find 
any empirical support for method of payment effects in private offers. On the contrary, 
bidding banks gain in such transactions, even when they pay with cash, stock, or a 
combination of the two. Moreover, we find that our results are not due to potential 
                                                
16 We repeated the same procedure for the choice between listed and unlisted targets. The results were 
qualitatively similar.  
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leakages of information about public acquisitions or limited competition for private 
targets. We further account for the several legislative changes in the U.S. banking 
industry. Notably, the listing effect is pervasive across all regulatory reforms.  
We examine the role of the financial advisors in the acquisitions by U.S. banks, and if 
the use of a financial advisor from the bidding banks has any predictive power in 
explaining announcement abnormal returns. Presumably, financial advisory services 
should be of major importance in reducing valuation uncertainties for acquirers of 
privately-held financial firms. Similarly, we predict positive abnormal returns for 
bidding banks that use financial advisors in private offers. Our results document that 
in-house acquisitions of private firms yield negative bidder returns in the scale of -
0.59%, whereas when an advisor is used, bidder abnormal returns are 1.47%, and 
statistical significant at 1%. This substantial difference in market reaction suggests that 
the acquisition of privately-held financial firm results in a positive market reaction only 
when a financial advisor is used on the part of the bidding bank. Otherwise, the bidder 
abnormal returns for private bids are similar to the ones reported for public bids. Lastly, 
results for subsidiary targets are inconclusive, and financial advisor reputation has a 
negative effect in bidder CARs in all cases. 
In cross-sectional regressions, where the five-day abnormal returns are the dependent 
variable, the listing effect is robust to the inclusion of several frequently-used 
independent variables such as bidder size, method of payment, geographical scope, and 
prior bidder performance. More precisely, our indicator variables that proxy for the 
listing status of the target firm and the use of bidder financial advisors in private offers 
are positive and statistical significant in all regressions. To account for the possibility 
that a bidder-specific factor may better explain the variation in bidder CARs, we 
included bidder fixed effects in our regressions. Despite the presence of a strong bidder 
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fixed effect in our sample, banks that acquire privately-held financial firms and use 
non-top-tier financial advisors in their transactions, experience larger abnormal returns 
relative to their competitors. Lastly, we control for the endogenous nature of bidder-
target matching. This analysis suggests that sample selection does not influence the 
consistency of our OLS estimates.  
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
Panel A: Deal Characteristics 
Variables Definition 
State Dummy variable: 1 if both bidder and target are headquartered in the same 
state, and 0 otherwise. 
Stock Dummy variable:  1 when the deal is finances purely with stock, and 0 
otherwise. 
Combo Dummy variable: 1 if the deal was financed with a combination of cash and 
stock, and 0 otherwise. 
RelSize The transaction value divided by the equity market capitalization of the 
bidding company 5 days prior to the merger announcement  
Private Dummy variable: 1 for acquisitions of privately-held targets, and 0 
otherwise. 
Subsidiary Dummy variable: 1 for acquisitions of subsidiary targets, and 0 otherwise. 
Pooling Dummy variable: 1 if the bidder had used the pooling accounting method to 
incorporate the target into its books, and 0 otherwise. 
Panel B: Bidder Characteristics 
Variables Definition 
Bidder Size The natural logarithm of the bidding firm’s total assets at year-end prior to 
the merger announcement. 
Volatility The standard deviation of the market-adjusted residuals from 210 to 20 days 
prior to the merger announcement.  
ROA Bidding firms' return on assets (ROA) at year-end prior to the merger 
announcement 
Panel C: Financial Advisor 
Variables Definition 
Advisors Dummy variable: 1 if the bidding firms had employed at least one financial 
advisor, and 0 otherwise. 
Top-Tier Dummy variable: 1 for financial advisors that belong to the top-tier group, 
or 0 otherwise. 
Panel D: Regulatory periods 
Variables Definition 
FIRREA Dummy variable:1 for deals announced during the FIRREA period (October 
1989 to June 1997), and 0 otherwise. 
Riegle-Neal Dummy variable:1 for deals announced during the Riegle-Neal period (July 
1997 to March 2000), and 0 otherwise. 
GLBA Dummy variable: 1 for deals announced during the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
period (April 2000 to June 2010), and 0 otherwise. 
DFA Dummy variable: 1 for deals announced during the Dodd-Frank period (July 
2010 to December 2015), and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 1 
Merger size by announcement year and target firm’s listing status. 
This table contains means for the total value of consideration paid by the bidder, excluding fees and 
expenses, segmented by year and target firm’s listing status. All values are adjusted for inflation (in 2015 
million $). The sample consists of all successful M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids 
announced between January 1, 1984 and December 31, 2015. Bidders are commercial banks with a three-
digit primary SIC code equal to 602, or bank holding companies with a four-digit primary SIC code equal 
to 6712.  Targets are comprised of publicly traded, privately-held firms, and unlisted subsidiaries of 
publicly traded firms. Merger data are collected from Thomson ONE database. 
  All  Public  Private  Subsidiary 
Year  Mean N  Mean N  Mean N  Mean N 
1984  88.307 28  429.613 3  47.851 24  35.34 1 
1985  352.382 20  756.003 8  90.589 10  46.86 2 
1986  314.209 44  990.255 10  92.047 31  356.4 3 
1987  380.896 52  1,067.29 16  64.141 33  204.437 3 
1988  188.433 24  529.703 6  61.128 17  305 1 
1989  222.874 55  549.955 18  39.801 32  217.052 5 
1990  143.769 35  64.556 8  74.228 23  702.054 4 
1991  580.61 56  1,219.65 25  38.74 23  141.477 8 
1992  256.583 70  437.778 32  97.507 33  146.834 5 
1993  176.325 133  420.435 42  54.932 77  111.655 14 
1994  142.474 162  330.703 50  53.985 99  92.399 13 
1995  628.09 122  1,486.20 50  29.615 63  50.152 9 
1996  294.718 105  714.209 34  58.584 66  559.153 5 
1997  911.925 153  2,525.90 48  83.744 90  716.303 15 
1998  1,316.581 144  3,892.70 46  76.029 88  383.322 10 
1999  517.509 101  1,057.70 45  56.727 48  243.606 8 
2000  1,083.804 75  1,972.67 38  47.626 32  959.932 5 
2001  405.048 75  872.118 28  56.25 41  608.833 6 
2002  329.798 48  612.72 17  39.503 25  737.744 6 
2003  1070.27 87  2,279.31 35  54.819 43  1,220.05 9 
2004  1,353.785 100  3,092.06 42  64.876 48  239.814 10 
2005  800.856 85  2,643.28 22  146.115 61  503.807 2 
2006  1,254.437 71  3,390.29 23  70.395 44  1,997.73 4 
2007  378.862 62  746.984 27  90.926 32  137.086 3 
2008  3,674.209 23  5,225.92 16  127.439 7  0 0 
2009  213.396 11  113.747 5  10.936 3  581.937 3 
2010  393.381 20  403.162 12  18.59 4  738.829 4 
2011  105.434 20  170.743 8  35.319 10  194.775 2 
2012  252.622 31  419.317 16  74.815 15  0 0 
2013  206.434 46  339.411 18  103.108 25  269.62 3 
2014  140.399 62  254.808 24  64.39 37  206.9 1 
2015  285.285 58  602.002 18  63.555 35  697.217 5 
Total  609.250 2,178  1,479.740 790  67.497 1,219  447.776 169 
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Table 2 
Merger Activity by target firm’s  
This table reports, by industry of the target firm, the fraction of sample firms that were acquired from 
1984 to 2015. Bidders are commercial banks with a three-digit primary SIC code equal to 602, or bank 
holding companies with a four-digit primary SIC code equal to 6712. Targets are comprised of publicity 
traded, privately-held firms, and unlisted subsidiaries of publicity traded firms. Target industry data are 
organized following Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classifications, using four-digit Primary SIC 
codes. Merger data are obtained from Thomson ONE database. 
Target Industry All Public Private Subsidiary 
Machinery 1 0 1 0 
Personal Services 1 1 0 0 
Business Services 27 5 15 7 
Retail 1 0 0 1 
Banking 1,947 730 1,078 139 
Insurance 18 0 17 1 
Real Estate 3 0 2 1 
Trading 180 54 106 20 
Total 2,178 790 1,219 169 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics by target firm’s listing status. 
This table summarizes descriptive statistics for all M&As of our sample, segmented by the target firm’s 
listing status. The sample consists of all successful M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids 
announced between January 1, 1984 and December 31, 2015. Bidders are commercial banks with a three-
digit primary SIC code equal to 602, or bank holding companies with a four-digit primary SIC code equal 
to 6712. Targets are comprised of publicly traded, privately-held firms, and unlisted subsidiaries of 
publicly traded firms. Panel A displays statistics for deal-specific variables. The transaction value is the 
total value of consideration paid by the bidder, excluding fees and expenses (in 2015 million $). Days to 
completion measures the calendar days between the announcement and effective dates. The percentages 
of cash, stock, and combo deals represent the method of payment. Geographic diversification is measured 
by the percentage of same state deals. The percentage of pooling method denotes the mergers that use 
the pooling method versus the purchase method to incorporate the target into the bidding firm’s books. 
The percentage of single bidders denotes the percentage of deals where the target firm received only one 
bid. Target’s equity percentages acquired and owned represent the proportion of target’s equity the bidder 
acquired in the transaction and owned after the transaction, respectively. Panel B details statistics for 
bidder-specific variables. Total Assets are the bidding firm’s total assets at year-end prior to the merger 
announcement (in 2015 million $). Market Value is the bidding firm’s market capitalization at year-end 
prior to the merger announcement (in 2015 million $). ROA is the bidding firm’s return on assets at year-
end prior to the merger announcement. Median values are in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 All Public Private Subsidiary 
Panel A: Deal characteristics     
Transaction value (million $) 609.25 1,479.74 67.50 447.78 
 [60.72] [203.71] [32.56] [86.92] 
Days to completion      170.79 191.84 162.79 130.08 
      [161.00] [175.00] [151.00] [123.00] 
% of cash deals 25.67 11.39 27.73 77.51 
% of stock deals 48.53 59.11 47.17 8.88 
% of combo deals 25.80 29.50 25.10 13.61 
% same state deals 48.53 45.44 52.09 37.28 
% pooling method 21.63 27.97 20.26 1.78 
% single bidders 98.86 98.10 99.92 100 
% Target’s equity acquired in transaction 99.66 99.66 99.64 99.79 
% Target’s equity owned after transaction 99.79 99.85 99.74 99.79 
Panel B: Bidder characteristics     
Total assets (million $) 46,137.81 57,244.15 18,578.80 192,939.30 
 [ 7,515.37] [13,450.43] [4,634.35] [27,918.38] 
Market value of equity (million $) 7,3668.55 9,965.42 2,853.78 27,794.48 
 [1,091.23] [2,129] [707.07] [3,387.48] 
ROA 1.05 1.04 1.07 0.99 
 [1.04] [1.06] [1.04] [1.00] 
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Table 4 
Top-25 financial advisors ranked by transaction value 
The table illustrates the top-25 financial advisor rankings over the period 2984 to 2015. The financial advisors are ranked based on the transaction value of deals they advised 
for a sample of M&As targeting U.S. firms. Transaction value is the total consideration paid for the target minus any liabilities assumed in transaction plus the target firm’s net 
debt (in $ millions). Credit is allocated to surviving/parent firms and to each eligible advisor in case of multiple advisors for a single entity. We exclude equity carve-outs, 
exchange offers, and open market repurchases. 
Announced Transactions  Completed Transactions 
Rank Financial Advisor Transaction Value Number of Deals  Rank Financial Advisor Transaction Value Number of Deals 
Top-Tier Financial Advisors 
1 Goldman Sachs & Co 9,171,621.71 5,170  1 Goldman Sachs & Co 8,696,073.32 5,046 
2 Morgan Stanley 7,056,243.57 4,226  2 Morgan Stanley 6,595,234.87 4,163 
3 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 6,681,615.86 5,499  3 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 6,316,775.23 5,387 
4 JP Morgan 6,520,060.41 4,908  4 JP Morgan 6,211,820.40 4,818 
5 Citi 5,419,015.57 4,782  5 Citi 5,061,962.47 4,714 
6 Credit Suisse 4,937,269.24 5,364  6 Credit Suisse 4,589,817.29 5,305 
7 Barclays 4,384,337.67 3,295  7 Barclays 4,082,195.80 3,254 
8 Lazard 2,814,979.35 2,252  8 Lazard 2,572,256.75 2,191 
Non-Top-Tier Financial Advisors 
9 UBS 2,623,536.10 3,265  9 UBS 2,438,392.08 3,252 
10 Deutsche Bank 2,183,201.29 2,386  10 Deutsche Bank 1,995,843.37 2,357 
11 Evercore Partners 1,511,295.59 643  11 Evercore Partners 1,264,683.56 599 
12 Centerview Partners LLC 867,383.97 178  12 Commerzbank AG 726,901.29 543 
13 Commerzbank AG 727,171.74 552  13 Wells Fargo & Co 697,188.30 1,152 
14 Wells Fargo & Co 713,205.85 1,181  14 PJT Partners Inc 652,395.47 443 
15 PJT Partners Inc 681,484.22 467  15 Centerview Partners LLC 649,428.79 152 
16 Houlihan Lokey 642,340.07 2,686  16 Houlihan Lokey 637,600.67 2,578 
17 Jefferies LLC 607,868.26 1,981  17 Jefferies LLC 594,458.62 1,940 
18 Greenhill & Co, LLC 527,069.08 270  18 Greenhill & Co, LLC 469,317.48 252 
19 RBC Capital Markets 494,477.80 1,713  19 Rothschild & Co 443,360.89 544 
20 Rothschild & Co 483,153.12 562  20 Stifel/KBW 417,217.82 1,769 
21 Moelis & Co 437,554.50 498  21 RBC Capital Markets 413,838.82 1,672 
22 Stifel/KBW 423,166.65 1,818  22 Moelis & Co 340,036.21 465 
23 Allen & Co Inc 403,219.73 187  23 Allen & Co Inc 318,107.71 184 
24 Guggenheim Securities LLC 373,673.24 88  24 BNP Paribas SA 241,047.45 103 
25 BNP Paribas SA 272,742.58 107  25 Guggenheim Securities LLC 237,546.10 80 
43	
	
Table 5 
Bidder cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date 
This table illustrates the bidder announcement cumulative abnormal returns.  The sample consists of all 
successful M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids announced between January 1, 1984 and 
December 31, 2015. Bidders are commercial banks with a three-digit primary SIC code equal to 602, or 
bank holding companies with a four-digit primary SIC code equal to 6712. Targets are comprised of 
publicly traded, privately-held firms, and unlisted subsidiaries of publicly traded firms. Abnormal returns 
are estimated using the market adjusted returns model for a five-day event window centered on the 
announcement date (-2, +2).  Results are further segmented according to the method of payment. Cash 
financing includes combination of cash, debt, and liabilities. Stock financing includes payments with 
common stock and combinations of commons stock, warrants, or options. Combo financing includes 
combination of cash, common stock, debt, preferred stock, convertible securities, and methods classified 
as “other consideration” by Thomson ONE database. The median CARs are in brackets and the number 
of mergers is below the medians. The parametric test is the standardized cross-sectional test, and the non-
parametric is the Wilcoxon signed rank test. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 All Public Private Subsidiary 
All bids -0.18%*** -1.45%*** 0.58%*** 0.31% 
 [-0.36%]*** [-1.34%]*** [0.21%]*** [-0.32%] 
 2,178 790 1,219 169 
Cash 0.43% -0.18% 0.61%** 0.41% 
 [0.11%] [0.12%] [0.27%]** [-0.31%] 
 559 90 338 131 
Stock -0.43%*** -1.61%*** 0.56%** -1.42% 
 [-0.51%]*** [-1.37%]*** [0.05%] [0.21%] 
 1,057 467 575 15 
Combo -0.33%*** -1.63%*** 0.57%** 0.92% 
 [-0.46%]** [-1.64%]*** [0.29%]* [-0.58%] 
 562 233 306 23 
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Table 6 
Bidder cumulative abnormal returns by regulatory period 
This table illustrates the bidder announcement cumulative abnormal returns for each regulatory period.  
The sample consists of all successful M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids announced between 
January 1, 1984 and December 31, 2015. Bidders are commercial banks with a three-digit primary SIC 
code equal to 602, or bank holding companies with a four-digit primary SIC code equal to 6712. Targets 
are comprised of publicly traded, privately-held firms, and unlisted subsidiaries of publicly traded firms. 
Results are segmented based on the different regulatory periods. FIRREA refers to the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989. Riegle-Neal is the Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Branching and Efficiency Act of 1994. GLBA refers to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial 
Modernization Act of 1999. DFA refers to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010. Regulatory periods are classified according to the dates when provisions of each piece of 
legislation became effective. Abnormal returns are estimated using the market adjusted returns model 
for a five-day event window centered on the announcement date (-2, +2). The median CARs are in 
brackets and the number of mergers is below the medians. The parametric test is the standardized cross-
sectional test, and the non-parametric is the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Significance for the difference 
between mean CARs is based on the t-test. Significance for the difference between median CARs is 
based on the Mann-Whitney test (in brackets). The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
 
 
 
All  
 
Public 
 
Private 
 
Subsidiary 
Difference 
Private-
Public 
Difference 
Subsidiary-
Public 
Pre-FIRREA -1.06%*** -2.80%*** -0.46% -0.28% 2.33%*** 2.52%* 
 [-0.69%]*** [-2.71%]*** [-0.36%] [1.01%] [2.35%]*** [3.72%]* 
 198 52 133 13   
FIRREA -0.16%** -1.32%*** 0.56%*** -0.03% 1.88%*** 1.30%** 
 [-0.19%] [-1.26%]*** [0.50%]*** [-0.09%] [1.76%]*** [1.17%]** 
 756 269 423 64   
Riegle-Neal  -0.84%*** -2.83%*** 0.30% -0.24% 3.13%*** 2.59%*** 
 [-0.87%]*** [-2.60%]*** [-0.31%] [-0.22%] [2.29%]*** [2.38%]*** 
 359 126 204 29   
GLBA 0.10%** -1.00%*** 0.76% 1.15% 1.76%*** 2.15%** 
 [-0.52%]* [-1.05%]*** [0.02%] [-0.53%] [1.07%]*** [0.52%]* 
 635 250 335 50   
Dodd-Frank  0.79%*** -0.41% 1.71%*** 0.61% 2.10%*** 1.00% 
 [0.50%]** [-0.44%] [1.23%]*** [-0.64%] [1.67%]*** [-0.20%] 
 230 93 124 13   
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Table 7 
Effect of financial advisors on bidder CARs 
This table illustrates the wealth effect of financial advisors on bidder announcement cumulative abnormal 
returns. The sample consists of all successful M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids announced 
between January 1, 1984 and December 31, 2015, where complete information about financial advisors 
could be identified. Bidders are commercial banks with a three-digit primary SIC code equal to 602, or 
bank holding companies with a four-digit primary SIC code equal to 6712. Targets are comprised of 
publicly traded, privately-held firms, and unlisted subsidiaries of publicly traded firms. Abnormal returns 
are estimated using the market adjusted returns model for a five-day event window centered on the 
announcement date (-2, +2). Panel A segments bidder CARs based on whether the merger was in-house 
(no investment bank retained) or at least one financial advisor was involved. Panel B segments bidder 
CARs based on the reputation of the financial advisor employed by the bidding bank. The median CARs 
are in brackets and the number of mergers is below the medians. The parametric test is the standardized 
cross-sectional test, and the non-parametric is the Wilcoxon signed rank test. The symbols *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 All Public Private Subsidiary 
Panel A: All Bids    
 -0.49%*** -1.75%*** 0.88%*** 0.53% 
 [-0.66%]*** [-1.73%]*** [0.43%]*** [-0.44%] 
 1055 540 443 72 
Panel B: Financial Advisor    
In-house -0.55%** -0.56% -0.59%* 0.60% 
 [-0.48%]** [-1.26%] [-0.40%] [0.49%]*** 
 194 61 127 6 
Bidder used 
advisor 
-0.48%*** -1.90%*** 1.47%*** 0.52% 
[-0.72%]*** [-1.81%]*** [0.66%]*** [-0.44%] 
 861 479 316 66 
Panel C: Reputation of Financial Advisor   
Top-Tier -1.57%*** -2.18%*** 0.07% -0.40% 
 [-1.67%]*** [-2.23%]*** [0.31%] [-0.44%] 
 261 184 47 30 
Non Top-Tier 0.00% -1.73%*** 1.72%*** 1.30% 
 [-0.28%] [-1.45%]*** [0.73%]*** [-0.46%] 
 600 295 269 36 
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Table 8 
OLS regression on bidder CARs 
This table reports the OLS regression results of the bidder’s five day CARs for a sample successful M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids announced between January 
1, 1984 and December 31, 2015. All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Significance is based on 
White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
  All  Public  Private  Subsidiary 
  1 2 3  4 5 6  7 8 9  10 11 12 
Constant  -0.017 -0.013 -0.030*  -0.018 0.011 -0.010  -0.008 -0.018 -0.028  -0.035 -0.052 -0.046 
  (-1.53) (-0.83) (-1.65)  (-0.91) (0.44) (-0.37)  (-0.62) (-0.78) (-1.12)  (-1.02) (-0.76) (-0.54) 
State  0.001 0.005 0.006*  0.001 0.004 0.004  0.001 0.006 0.007*  0.011 0.016 0.011 
  (0.67) (1.60) (1.81)  (0.26) (0.90) (0.91)  (0.41) (1.35) (1.66)  (1.21) (1.01) (0.67) 
Stock  0.001 0.001 0.000  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003  0.001 -0.001 -0.001  0.003 -0.014 -0.027 
  (0.58) (0.16) (0.10)  (-0.77) (-0.42) (-0.47)  (0.49) (-0.12) (-0.09)  (0.26) (-0.50) (-0.91) 
Combo  -0.005** -0.004 -0.007*  -0.012** -0.011 -0.014**  -0.003 0.001 -0.003  0.000 -0.006 -0.008 
  (-1.97) (-1.01) (-1.85)  (-2.49) (-1.64) (-1.96)  (-1.08) (0.20) (-0.56)  (0.01) (-0.21) (-0.31) 
RelSize  -0.014** -0.014 -0.012  -0.018** -0.012 -0.009  0.023* 0.026 0.031*  -0.006 0.017 0.029 
  (-1.99) (-1.59) (-1.39)  (-2.10) (-1.23) (-0.95)  (1.78) (1.45) (1.69)  (-0.13) (0.21) (0.36) 
Bidder Size  -0.001* -0.001 -0.000  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000  -0.001 0.000 0.001  0.005 0.004 0.001 
  (-1.81) (-0.45) (-0.33)  (-0.60) (-0.22) (-0.02)  (-0.77) (0.14) (0.45)  (0.19) (0.77) (0.29) 
Private  0.015*** 0.020*** 0.020***             
  (6.72) (6.09) (6.18)             
Subsidiary  0.012*** 0.012* 0.013*             
  (2.96) (1.73) (1.79)             
Volatility  0.698*** 0.402 0.561**  0.571* 0.223 0.307  0.616** 0.330 0.581  1.434 1.580 1.890 
  (3.67) (1.43) (1.98)  (1.70) (0.50) (0.68)  (2.55) (0.85) (1.48)  (1.53) (1.08) (1.42) 
ROA  0.002 -0.002 -0.000  0.002 -0.004 -0.003  0.001 0.000 0.005  0.007 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.82) (-0.57) (-0.02)  (0.60) (-0.82) (-0.50)  (0.34) (0.06) (0.69)  (0.92) (-0.18) (-0.20) 
Pooling  -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.006  -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.016***  -0.004 0.001 0.007  -0.056* -0.105* -0.119* 
  (-3.31) (-2.84) (-1.50)  (-3.46) (-3.39) (-2.68)  (-1.10) (0.22) (1.13)  (-1.82) (-1.71) (-1.88) 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
 
  All  Public  Private  Subsidiary 
  1 2 3  4 5 6  7 8 9  10 11 12 
Advisors   0.007* 0.001   -0.012** -0.017***   0.016*** 0.011*   -0.011 -0.031 
   (1.80) (0.26)   (-2.13) (-2.73)   (3.27) (1.88)   (-0.44) (-1.06) 
Top-Tier   -0.005 -0.001   -0.001 0.002   -0.009 -0.004   -0.002 -0.001 
   (-1.16) (-0.15)   (-0.27) (0.39)   (-1.43) (-0.56)   (-0.14) (-0.07) 
FIRREA  0.009***  0.011  0.016**  0.021**  0.008**  -0.004  -0.004  0.016 
  (3.10)  (1.49)  (2.34)  (2.09)  (2.33)  (-0.38)  (-0.30)  (0.34) 
Riegle-Neal  0.001  0.001  0.004  0.011  0.001  -0.016  -0.008  0.026 
  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.47)  (0.95)  (0.12)  (-1.53)  (-0.60)  (0.55) 
GLBA  0.010***  0.017**  0.015**  0.024**  0.00738**  0.001  0.006  0.043 
  (3.30)  (2.24)  (2.27)  (2.38)  (2.05)  (0.07)  (0.43)  (0.93) 
DFA  0.021***  0.026***  0.025***  0.031***  0.021***  0.013  0.009  0.064 
  (5.65)  (3.16)  (3.05)  (2.66)  (5.02)  (1.28)  (0.42)  (1.33) 
N  2,178 1,055 1,055  790 540 540  1,219 443 443  169 72 72 
Adjusted R2  0.084 0.081 0.097  0.059 0.035 0.050  0.041 0.048 0.070  0.012 0.00 0.00 
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Table 9 
Fixed effects regression on bidder CARs 
This table reports the fixed effects regression results of the bidder’s five day CARs for a sample 
successful M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids announced between January 1, 1984 and 
December 31, 2015. All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Significance is based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The joint significance of bidder fixed effects 
(FE) is also reported. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -0.009 -0.004 0.017 
 (-0.33) (-0.12) (0.46) 
State 0.002 0.006 0.006 
 (0.68) (1.47) (1.44) 
Stock -0.001 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.53) (-1.22) (-1.28) 
Combo -0.008*** -0.015*** -0.017*** 
 (-2.91) (-2.76) (-3.00) 
RelSize -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.031*** 
 (-2.78) (-2.83) (-3.00) 
Bidder Size 0.000 0.002 -0.004 
 (-0.17) (0.59) (-0.99) 
Private 0.009***   
 (3.61)   
Subsidiary 0.005   
 (1.02)   
Private*Advisors  0.012** 0.011** 
  (2.28) (2.01) 
Private*Top-Tier  -0.003 -0.002 
  (-0.44) (-0.21) 
Subsidiary*Advisors  -0.005 -0.005 
  (-0.44) (-0.43) 
Subsidiary*Top-Tier  -0.006 -0.006 
  (-0.35) (-0.37) 
Volatility 0.508** 0.174 0.349 
 (1.98) (0.36) (0.70) 
ROA -0.001 -0.008 -0.004 
 (-0.28) (-1.24) (-0.50) 
Pooling -0.010*** -0.009** -0.007 
 (-3.39) (-1.97) (-1.45) 
FIRREA 0.007*  0.019** 
 (1.86)  (2.03) 
Riegle-Neal -0.001  0.012 
 (-0.12)  (1.22) 
GLBA 0.006  0.025** 
 (0.88)  (2.27) 
DFA 0.019**  0.035*** 
 (2.34)  (2.70) 
Number of unique bidders 506 392 392 
Bidder FE F-test 1.452*** 1.258*** 1.239*** 
N 2,178 1,055 1,055 
Adjusted R2 0.172 0.168 0.174 
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Table 10 
Heckman two-stage procedure on bidder CARs 
This table reports the results of the Heckman two-stage procedure for bidder five day CARs for a sample 
successful M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids announced between January 1, 1984 and 
December 31, 2015. The first column of each set of models is the first-stage equations estimated by 
probit regressions, in which the dependent variable is 1 if the target firm was private and 0 if it was 
public. The second column of each set of models is the second-stage equations estimated by OLS 
regressions, where the dependent variable is the bidder CARs for private bids, and the Inverse Mills ratio 
accounts for the presence of selection bias. All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Significance is based on White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively, using a 2-tail 
test. 
 
 Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 6.523*** -0.003 5.853*** -0.025 6.077*** -0.031 
 (15.84) (-0.08) (10.23) (-0.45) (9.36) (-0.52) 
State -0.151** 0.001 -0.352*** 0.007 -0.352*** 0.008 
 (-2.08) (0.37) (-3.33) (1.32) (-3.32) (1.52) 
Stock -0.490*** 0.001 -0.607*** 0.002 -0.591*** 0.002 
 (-4.78) (0.37) (-3.81) (0.24) (-3.70) (0.21) 
Combo -0.387*** -0.003 -0.475*** 0.002 -0.396** -0.002 
 (-3.53) (-0.92) (-3.05) (0.37) (-2.45) (-0.32) 
RelSize -4.067*** 0.015 -3.143*** 0.024 -3.203*** 0.025 
 (-12.23) (0.53) (-10.03) (0.57) (-9.87) (0.59) 
Bidder Size -0.503*** -0.001 -0.499*** 0.001 -0.503*** 0.001 
 (-15.81) (-0.42) (-10.39) (0.20) (-10.34) (0.23) 
Volatility 3.404 0.589** 8.672 0.245 7.931 0.510 
 (0.54) (2.42) (1.10) (0.63) (0.96) (1.29) 
ROA -0.080 0.001 -0.091 0.001 -0.078 0.004 
 (-0.78) (0.30) (-0.71) (0.11) (-0.59) (0.64) 
Pooling -0.160* -0.004 -0.062 0.001 -0.128 0.007 
 (-1.67) (-1.07) (-0.49) (0.18) (-0.90) (1.120) 
FIRREA -0.585*** 0.008   -0.146 -0.004 
 (-4.53) (1.57)   (-0.530) (-0.40) 
Riegle-Neal -0.566*** 0.000   -0.213 -0.016 
 (-3.70) (0.01)   (-0.72) (-1.46) 
GLBA -0.856*** 0.007   -0.401 0.001 
 (-6.26) (1.12)   (-1.41) (0.08) 
DFA -0.854*** 0.021***   -0.403 0.0132 
 (-5.47) (3.13)   (-1.38) (1.07) 
Advisors   -0.445*** 0.019*** -0.328** 0.0127** 
   (-3.14) (2.77) (-2.17) (2.07) 
Top-Tier   0.034 -0.008 -0.065 -0.003 
   (0.25) (-1.22) (-0.46) (-0.40) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.001  -0.007  -0.005 
  (0.04)  (-0.31)  (-0.25) 
N 2,009 1,219 983 443 983 443 
Pseudo-R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.279 (0.037) 0.294 (0.041) 0.297 (0.061) 
 
